

**PROJECT DOCUMENT**

Project Title: Support to Integrated Reconciliation in Iraq

Project Number:

Implementing Partner: UNDP

Start Date: 1 Jan 2017

End Date: Dec 2019

PAC Meeting date:

**Brief Description**

Since 2003, Iraq has undertaken at least three major national reconciliation programmes: first, there was the Arab League’s attempts at mediation in 2006; second, the Al-Maliki government’s “Reconciliation and National Dialogue Plan” in 2006; and third the process associated with the current Prime Minister Al-Abadi. For different reasons, these initiatives have not seen the goal of national unity and stability realised. Instead Iraq has been subjected to a burgeoning insurgency, rising sectarian tensions, increasing political alienation amongst some sections of the population, the victimisation of minorities, and of course, the unprecedented rise of ISIS.

Reasons for these challenges and setbacks are complex. Yet, it is clear that, too often, previous attempts at reconciliation were fundamentally elite- and/or foreign-driven, and thus devoid of meaningful civic participation. Also, critically important has been the much neglected relationship between reconciliation on the one hand, and the demand for accountability and transitional justice on the other, which has never received the careful and systematic attention it deserves and requires.

The current moment in Iraq’s national life offers an unprecedented chance for progress towards national reconciliation. The unity of purpose which has developed in the fight against ISIS is an opportunity to strengthen national reconciliation which may, for the first time, be informed by the real concerns of citizens across the country; and at the same time, be responsibly balanced with the inalienable right of victims to accountability and redress.

Through its new reconciliation unit, the UNDP intends to develop a nuanced, systematic approach to transitional justice and reconciliation which would resonate with Iraqi citizens’ most pressing concerns.

Important to note, is that this is neither simply a “community-level”, nor a “national-level” process, but an approach to develop, support and sustain civic participation in reconciliation and transitional justice processes at every level of society, from communities to the highest corridors of power.

This approach can be characterised as:

- locally-owned (not imposed),
- victim-centred (not predominantly perpetrator-focused),
- inclusive (not sectarian), and
- civic-led (not only top-down)

To achieve this, UNDP is working to support the development of a three-fold mechanism, each of which will build on, and expand, existing initiatives, and be conducted under the leadership of Iraqi stakeholders. These are:

- 1 A National Network of Civic Platforms dedicated to Reconciliation at all levels in society;
- 2 Public Awareness Campaigns focused on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice;
- 3 A Citizens’ Archive of Gross Human Rights Violations (GHV’s) with recommendations for follow-up steps towards comprehensive transitional justice in Iraq.

Total resources required:	<b>\$ 50,000,000</b>	
Total resources allocated:	UNDP TRAC:	
	Donor 1:UK FCO	1,200,000 USD (1,000,000 GBP)
	Donor:	
	Government:	
	In-Kind:	
Unfunded:	<b>\$ 48,800,000</b>	

Agreed by (signatures):

Government	UNDP
Print Name:	Print Name:
Date:	Date:

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## I. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

The fall of the Ba'ath party in the wake of the US-led military invasion and consequent occupation, led to a nascent political legitimacy attached to the "new Iraq" invoking a collective sense of suffering during the Saddam Hussein era. This paved the way for an election where a majority Shia led elite (in coalition with Kurdish constituencies) gained substantial influence in government. As it quickly became apparent that sectarian and ethnic conflict would not disappear overnight. In fact, these divisions have dominated Iraq's political and social landscape since 2003, contributing significantly to a violent insurgency culminating in the rise and military demise, of ISIS, together with a range of additional and overlaying conflicts. These include, most recently, the serious threat of renewed intra-Shia violence, Kurdish/Sunni clashes in the Kirkuk area and PMF/Peshmerga competition in the post-Mosul period amongst the most pressing concerns.

In June 2014, when ISIS unexpectedly conquered Mosul and quickly extended its territory, major areas came under its direct control within Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salahuddin and Diyala governorates, in addition to Anbar. The Iraqi Army retreated to within a few kilometres of Baghdad while ISIS established control over the areas it has captured. Whilst this devastating rise of ISIS took most observers by surprise, in areas of the country removed from the direct fighting, there was mounting evidence of killings of former government personnel, religious communities and people who perceived as opposing the ISIS fighters. In Ninewah, a number of Iraqis initially showed support for ISIS's efforts to push out the government, which was deeply unpopular in many Sunni areas. In retrospect however, many of these actors, now appear to have been mainly focused on removing the influence of Baghdad from their communities in favour of more direct control over local affairs, rather than on ISIS's grand political goal of creating of an Islamic state.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) too utilised the ISIS event to consolidate security in the areas under its direct control. The KRG has also taken control of the contested city of Kirkuk, though not of the whole governorate, and Kurdish separatism has regained some momentum.

In the south of Iraq, citizen militias have been created to defend predominantly Shia areas against the threat of ISIS. Such militias are coming to be seen as a primary provider of security. As sectarian narratives within politics increase, there is a worrying possibility of such militias fuelling, and returning to, the sectarian violence of 2005-08.

As the military roll-back of ISIS gained momentum, many of the armed groups engaged in new cycles of violence, which appear, at least at face value, to reinforce ethno-sectarian ideologies. This included serious human rights violations against citizens, such as forced displacements, selective returns of IDPs, destruction of properties, ethno-demographic re-engineering, and the increasing militarization of society.

Since 2003, Iraq has undertaken several national reconciliation initiatives, which have involved, in main, the international community, regional actors and the Iraqi government. In this context of unabated political and sectarian tensions, these initiatives have largely failed to deliver tangible progress. There are many reasons, both internal and external to Iraq, for these failures. For one, too often Iraqi transitional justice has focused on punishing perpetrators, ignoring the exceptionally high levels of material, social and psychological victimisation of society. Indeed, there is no agreed upon narrative on the past and the competing memories translate into competing narratives of victimisation demanding retribution and compensation as justice.

Where victims were taken into account, it happened almost exclusively through the lens of "compensation", which would invariably fall short of what victims in fact needed, both materially and psychologically. Additionally, where perpetrators have been held to account, due process has often been lacking, running the risk of reigniting further cycles of grievances and violence. Too, the various bodies designed to promote "national reconciliation" have themselves become fragmented, lacking any coordination with one another, and often rather competing with one another to fashion reconciliation agendas more attuned to one political agenda or another in.

Civil society actors such as associations of former Iraqi political prisoners, in turn, have persistently called for greater access to the political process to raise these and other concerns. While a number of initiatives took place to launch more inclusive dialogue processes, these have been largely unsuccessful. The Arab League initiative, for example, failed to make an impact domestically, predominately as a result of the fact that the mediator itself, in this case the Arab League, was adjudged to be both partial to the conflict, and much too far removed from Iraqi communities themselves. The tenures of both Prime Ministers Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi have seen top-level efforts to bring parties together in the name of Iraqi unity, but which have largely failed to curb increasing violence and tension across the country. While political, religious and civic reconciliation efforts have been intensified since 2015, they have taken place largely in silos, with little interaction among one another, with fragmented agendas urgently requiring greater horizontal and vertical integration in order to create the necessary momentum to maximize impact.

Another short-coming of previous initiatives is that reconciliation tended to promote singular victimization narratives to the exclusion of others (such as youth, minorities, women, etc.), depending on whom led the initiatives, hence increasingly politicizing the process. Women, for example, have been systematically excluded from reconciliation processes, with their participation being today absolutely paramount given the prevalence of GBV and the number of women who have become single heads of households.

Finally, while minorities have often been subject of political jockeying and “clientelism”, they have today transformed into political and armed groups who are also to be reckoned with if reconciliation is to prove sustainable.

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## II. STRATEGY

### Approach and theory of change

Given this context, it is imperative that any reconciliation approach to Iraq after ISIS ought to begin with a presumption that only a comprehensive plan, executed in a consistent and inclusive manner, and implemented through decentralized and localized mechanisms, would stand a chance of medium to long-term success. This would require a solid understanding of what had failed and succeeded in the past, not only in Iraq, but globally—and how the international community could support an Iraqi-led, victim-focused, inclusive and civic-minded approach to national reconciliation.

This project is designed as the first stage of such an effort to promote reconciliation as a pathway towards a more non-violent, representative and resilient Iraq.

Due to the lack of trust between groups and actors in Iraq, as well as its unparalleled footprint on the ground in Iraq, UNDP has been identified by Iraqi interlocutors as being able to help promote steps towards national reconciliation, which would be thoroughly informed by the perspectives, needs and concerns of ordinary citizens. It is paramount to emphasise that the UNDP remains deeply conscious of its own limits in these efforts, not only in so far as any successful reconciliation ought to be Iraqi-led, but also to the extent that many credible actors are already contributing in different ways to national reconciliation, including importantly UNAMI.

This project aims to lay significant groundwork to allow the GoI to respond effectively to the issue of reconciliation as seen and experienced by the citizens of Iraq. It is expected that activities contained within this proposal will constitute only the first stage of a long-term engagement by UNDP with the GoI regarding reconciliation. The UNDP stands ready to engage with the GoI on the parameters of a technical assistance package that will allow the GoI to develop a sustainable and responsive society-wide reconciliation process. Depending on the success of these engagements with political counterparts, such assistance may already be offered before the conclusion of this project. Indeed, it could be incorporated at a later stage as a substantive amendment to this proposal, or as a parallel, but complementary, project.

At the same time as it looks forward, the project is also consciously designed to build on the positive gains of ongoing and past reconciliation efforts, relying on existing civic structures, as well as national committees and organizations for reconciliation such as the National Reconciliation Commission, The Reconciliation Committee in the Parliament, the local reconciliation committees, and the Presidency Reconciliation Councils. By analysing the lessons learnt, UNDP has pooled together the insight and wealth of experience that Iraqis have accumulated over the years to avoid making the same mistakes in the post-ISIS era and to build on previous experiences and insights gained.

In order to achieve the objectives outlined in the project's strategy, UNDP Iraq and in close cooperation with its sister agencies and key stakeholders and counterparts, will support Iraqi citizens and institutions to pursue three inter-related, concurrent outcomes underscored by vigorous programme coordination:

1. Community, Regional and National Reconciliation processes and platforms linked with, and responsive to, one another;
2. Public Awareness of Reconciliation and Transitional Justice;
3. The systematic and inclusive documentation of Gross Human Rights Violations (GHV's) in Iraq with recommendations for further transitional justice initiatives not least as far as accountability and redress measures are concerned;

In a first line of effort, trust-building mechanisms will be developed through local community reconciliation processes through Local Peace Committees (LPCs) that will serve as a venue to develop civic-driven agendas for reconciliation, including early warning, conflict resolution, transitional justice and development prioritisation. The horizontal linkages that the LPCs will create and reinforce will also

bolster vertical linkages between citizens and national and local institutions, coordinating reconciliation strategies from the local governorates to the National Reconciliation Commission and the ministries. UNDP's ability to work with the national government on such issues would be strengthened by success examples at the governorate level. As such, UNDP intends to build the capacity of selected governorate authorities to adopt and implement a reconciliation approach at a whole-of-government level and to become responsive towards local efforts to build peace.

**Outcome 1:** Enhanced social cohesion in targeted communities and regions, as well as higher levels of trust between these communities/regions and the national leadership in Baghdad; National Reconciliation Mechanisms address civic concerns in addition to top-level political interests; Constitutional Review Processes consult the broader Iraqi public.

Activities will be carried out to achieve this output are;

- A network of inter-linked local peace committees, bodies and initiatives operating at district, provincial and national levels is established;
- Community-focused agendas, work-plans and monitoring mechanisms are implemented, focusing on reconciliation-related needs in communities such as regulating the conduct of armed forces/groups, countering violent extremism, fostering the non-violent resolution of conflict, appropriate interim vetting, early warning mechanisms and accountability mechanisms.
- Develop a Charter of Principles that define the scope and breadth of the LPC's work, agreed upon by main stakeholder and with the support UNDP and UNAMI;
- Develop a social cohesion measurement tool, which will track change over time in order to assess impact of the initiatives and facilitate adaptation.
- A community reconciliation conference, drawing on communities from across the country is held to develop civic perspectives on, and demands for, the implementation of the findings of the project.

The second, concurrent line of effort will be to launch an awareness campaign to inform target communities of the peace committees and the "Citizens' Archive", and to sensitize individuals on the importance of their role in shaping the national reconciliation policy by feeding into the national database with flow of information of real stories on human rights violations. This component will also mobilize national champions who will be the key actors in delivering well-designed reconciliation messages not only to promote social cohesion, but also to encourage victims of human rights abuses to voluntarily participate in archiving their experiences. Running alongside, supporting, but also capitalising on, the "infrastructure of peace" constructed in phase 1, the aim will be to enhance social cohesion through targeted, coordinated public awareness campaigns involving credible civic leaders in Iraq, from the media, judiciary, non-governmental, academic, sport, cultural, youth, education and other spheres. While having localised benefits, the efforts will also provide an example of how such an approach can work throughout Iraq. Given the sensitivity involved in human right violations experienced by the victims that might result of psychological suffering, and in order to manage expectations on the outcomes of the voluntarily participation, UNDP will design the campaign carefully with greater focus on "Do No Harm" principle.

**Outcome 2:** Increased Public Awareness of the needs and possibilities for reconciliation and transitional justice.

Two main activities will be undertaken under this output;

- Awareness of reconciliation is raised in selected target areas;
- Capacitated local and national champions are mobilised for reconciliation and transitional justice;

A final area of work for the project activities will be geared towards developing a first-ever citizen's archive of GHV's in Iraq as a concrete step towards a comprehensive transitional justice programme for entire country. The outcomes are a complex set of goals: to offer victims some personal recognition of their suffering, to establish a historical record of political violence in Iraq, to afford victims official recognition as citizens of Iraq, to produce a set of concrete recommendations to the GoI and to the international communities with regard to a consistent and systematic accountability and redress plan for Iraq and finally to contribute to memorialisation efforts in the future, once the country is sufficiently stable and united. The strategy is for any person who at any time in the country's history had directly suffered or whose close relatives had suffered gross human rights violation as stipulated in international law (for example the Rome Statute) to be able to record their testimony without fear of retaliation or revenge. In this way, the Citizens' Archive will not only contribute towards nation-building in the positive sense of the word, but also to a responsible and consistent approach to transitional justice for Iraq.

**Outcome 3:** Establish a first-ever Citizens' Archive of GHV's in Iraq with recommendations for transitional justice in post-ISIS, to create official recognition by the Iraqi State in a uniform and inclusive manner, of the human and civic dignity of victims of GHV's in Iraq and thus to help restore victims' dignity as citizens of Iraq; to provide concrete recommendations for accountability and redress recorded by victims; to establish a public record of political violence in Iraq; to provide the material for possible memorialisation of deceased victims in the future.

Activities will be carried out to achieve this output are;

- Cooperation agreements that secure the Iraqi ownership and international support mechanisms are developed under the custodianship of the UNDP;
- Programme capacity is developed to safely record, store and analyse a critical mass of testimonies from victims of GVH's.
- Individual statements of Iraqis who have suffered and been subjected to gross human rights violations are recorded and safely stored. An initial target of 30K statements will be pursued to ensure that the archive is seen as sufficiently robust and broad-ranging.
- A report is prepared and delivered to the GoI, based on an analysis of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for:
  - An affordable, but adequate reparation regime for victims of gross human rights violations;
  - Accountability measures for all those responsible for these violations;
  - National and regional plans for the medium- to longer-term memorialisation of Iraqi victims;
  - Agreements and Protocols governing the responsibility of the international community, the GoI and the KRG for the implementation of these recommendations.

This project will also include developing practical programming principles for reconciliation, reviewing existing UNDP programming, providing training on how to incorporate reconciliation approaches for government and UNDP staff and developing a locally owned reconciliation index for the country. By mainstreaming reconciliation within its own programming, UNDP will not only contribute to reconciliation directly, but would be setting an example for the government and for other UN and international agencies to do the same – it will also allow UNDP to fulfil its strategic priorities identified through its UNDAF, CPD and the UNDP Strategic Plan.

### ***Resources Required to Achieve the Expected Results***

The project, once scaled up, will require a budget of approximately \$50 M, with national and international dedicated staff who will be recruited as per the staffing plan (Annex 2). The project focuses on alignment with other projects and building on UNDP's existing capacity within the country office.

Firstly, it will actively draw on, and contribute to, expertise resident in other projects within the office, such as in governance, disaster risk reduction, human rights, rule of law, local economic development and environment. This will happen in all activities but is particularly relevant for outcome 1, where the reconciliation support to governorate authorities to support peace committees in their areas can either bolster existing projects in governorates or open up new opportunities for engagement.

The project also addresses the necessity in the current environment of mainstreaming a reconciliation approach across all of UNDP's activities in Iraq and seeks to support other projects through training and ongoing advice. This will be done in a participatory way that aims to enhance the capacity of all projects to achieve UNDP's objectives in Iraq. The project will also be closely linked to, and supportive of, efforts to promote reconciliation within existing projects – such as the reconciliation component of the 'Accelerated Support for Non-camp Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Kurdistan Region in Iraq' project. Finally, due to its networks and the nature of its work, the reconciliation project team can act as a repository for institutional knowledge relating to the reconciliation/conflict context in Iraq and reconciliation programming responses

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### III. RESULTS AND PARTNERSHIPS

#### *Partnerships*

The project could be perceived as a unique opportunity to enhance the coordination, integration and knowledge sharing between initiatives dedicated to develop the civic dimensions of reconciliation. Partnerships are therefore fundamental to ensure success and achieve the desired outcomes in this project. The UNDP will work on building multidimensional partnerships, and engagement arrangement, internally and externally as outlined below:

#### Consolidate existing UNDP reconciliation work

As identified above, the activities under the Support to Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Iraq project are closely aligned with the objectives of the 2015-2019 UNDAF, which has the concept of social cohesion at its heart. While the ability of the UNCT to concentrate on development efforts in Iraq within the context of the June 2014 crisis is still uncertain, this project will seek to undertake complementary activities where they can be identified during the project time-frame.

Additionally, through mainstreaming reconciliation across its programming, UNDP will encourage its sister UN agencies to similarly prioritise the concept. With that end in mind, staff from other UN agencies will be invited to take part in reconciliation mainstreaming training.

The project will rest on three key pillar programmes of UNDP, which are Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program (ICRRP), Community Reconciliation (Window 4) under Stabilization and the Parliamentary Support Programme. Seeking to consolidate and build on the work done under these three programmes in the initial stages to create the cross-community and cross-country linkages.

UNDP's ICRRP provides fast-track support to vulnerable families in newly liberated cities and villages where social tensions threaten community cohesion. ICRRP operates in areas where post-liberation dynamics are complex and difficult and where stabilization requires medium-term integrated programming over a 24-36 months' period. ICRRP is currently active in eleven newly liberated communities in Diyala, Salah al Din and Ninawa Governorates. Local NGOs, community leaders, local media and provincial councils are trained in mediation and encouraged to engage in local dialogue. As a step in transitional justice, individual grievances and abuses are acknowledged and archived.

UNDP's Funding Facility for Immediate Stability (FFIS) window 4 has focused on the population that have been returning after displacement by ISIS and ensuing liberation efforts. Under Window 4, activities focused on capacity-building in reconciliation and restorative justice by training local community leaders on mediation, planning reconciliation processes, adopting restorative justice approaches, as well as developing the technical capacity of CSOs by training them in conflict analysis and developing their own initiatives. Window 4 engaged in Ninawa, Salahadin and Anbar setting up semi-formal structures in collaboration with the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) that address and solve grievances. These structures vary from 8 to 15 individuals per area who have been carefully selected, vetted and trained by local stakeholders to ensure that the initiatives remain Iraqi-led. Ongoing support to these groups is provided by Sanad (the main implementing partner for Window 4). In addition, there are monthly working group meetings which bring together governorates representatives of the NRC, the governor's office, members of the international community, CSO's, United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the UNDP to identify possible areas of collaboration between national and local reconciliation planning.

UNDP's Parliamentary Support programme has been working extensively with COR committees, the Speakers' Office, and various other national bodies of reconciliation on legislative, and other requirements needed to create a national climate conducive to reconciliation after Daesh.

A collaborative agreement between the GoI, UNDP and a third party state will provide a safeguard on the protection and anonymity of individuals who come forward and provide their own account of what happened. The project will therefore move beyond what has been done before by setting in motion the



beginning of a truth process but also step up actions through an inter-agency process, particularly with UNAMI and UNHRO pushing for institutional reforms on reconciliation processes, individual accountability and redress measures. The process will be critically influenced by the measure of success in the UNAMI-driven processes of facilitating agreement between political forces on key reconciliation issues.

## **Communications**

Due to the importance of maintaining a sense of Iraqi ownership over reconciliation activities in Iraq, UNDP sees the importance in maintaining a discrete profile regarding its programming. The country office's communications strategy should incorporate this. While UNDP should not shy away from acknowledging its efforts in favour of reconciliation and its support for the concept, these should not be at the risk of undermining Iraqi leadership with regard to the concept on the ground.

Nevertheless, UNDP will draw on its communications resources to help inform its Iraqi partners with regard to communicating for reconciliation. Building on its work to identify how traditional and social media can be utilised more effectively for reconciliation in Iraq under activity 3.3, UNDP will seek to provide advice to the champions and to its governorate government partners on effective communications strategies for reconciliation.

A final important point is that the concept of reconciliation, and specifically the Arabic translation used by UNDP, have been selected due to its acceptance by Iraqi interlocutors during focus groups and interviews. Most fundamentally, the concept phrase does not yet have any preconceived associations as the result of previous government policy approaches (unlike other terms such as 'reconciliation', 'conflict', or various Arabic translations of 'cohesion') in Iraq. As such, UNDP should be careful to use the term 'reconciliation' with reference primarily to specific activities or Iraqi-led efforts. To misuse, or overuse, the phrase runs the risk of either weakening its usefulness or ascribing a specific interpretation that could be detrimental.

## **Cross-cutting issues**

### *Human rights*

Recognition of the intrinsic value of human rights is a strong part of UNDP's understanding of the concept of reconciliation. The concept is centred on promoting a more inclusive, responsive and resilient state and society, which is inextricably linked to protection of human rights. The Support for Reconciliation in Iraq – Stage I project will incorporate a Human Rights Based Approach and mainstream ideas of human rights across the materials produce and the technical support and advice provided to Iraqi partners. This will be done, where necessary, in conjunction with UNDP's existing capacities through its human rights projects.

### *Gender sensitivity*

It is impossible to consider reconciliation without strongly involving and empowering women and addressing issues relating to gender exclusion and inequalities. Women also play a key role in society in supporting, and also potentially undermining, attitudes towards tolerance. The Support for Reconciliation in Iraq – Stage I project will adopt a strong gender sensitive approach to its work. In the first instance, it will ensure that between 40-60% of all reconciliation champions are women while encouraging governorate governments to include women in development of reconciliation policies. Participation and inclusion in project activities, however, does not equal gender sensitivity. The project will also seek to sensitise project partners regarding the importance of addressing women's issues and the essential role that women can play in promoting reconciliation. It will also work to ensure that champions' and governorate government's efforts include attempts to specifically address inequalities relating to women. To do this, the project will draw heavily on the resources of UNDP Iraq's existing gender sensitivity officer.

### *Conflict sensitivity*

Given the current context, there is a strong need to be conflict sensitive in terms of programming. Particularly given the role that divisions between groups and communities in Iraq are playing regarding conflict in the country, together with the potential for such influences to grow, reconciliation efforts overlap with conflict and peacebuilding programming. As such, the activities under the Support for Reconciliation in Iraq – Stage I project, while still foundational, aim to shape an environment in which the Iraqi state and society can address structural social causes of conflict in the country. Nevertheless, some conflict related risks have been identified, either affecting project activities or being affected by them, and are recorded in the risk log.

Perhaps the largest conflict risk is that efforts to encourage Iraqi actors to engage in, and lead, efforts to promote reconciliation may result in the such actors adopting a different conceptualisation of reconciliation which is exclusive rather than inclusive, which could play a role in exacerbating conflict. Mitigation for this risk concentrates on careful selection of Iraqi partners – and in the worst case scenario the management response would be to end specific project activities. While such risks do exist, in many ways the opportunity cost of not engaging on reconciliation within the current context is much greater.

### *Risks and Assumptions*

Given the previous efforts that took place in Iraq to secure a reconciliation process at various levels of Iraqi society. Over the years, grievances and scepticism have consequently grown. The current sectarian and ethnic tensions in liberated areas, combined with selected returns and the security and political vacuums after ISIS have left an important swath of the country unstable.

The project will be playing into but also will be vulnerable to socio-political upheavals that will take place in a post-ISIS environment in Iraq. In addition, given that the provincial and the parliamentary elections will take place in the second year of the project, the armed groups and political parties may adopt different policies that may run counter to the reconciliation process or old alliances and agreements could break down.

In addition, given that the National Reconciliation Commission is currently tied to the current Prime Minister's office, Haider Al Abadi, a change of PM could very much indicate either the breakdown of the body or replacement of its members by hard liners depending on the outcome of the elections. Given that previous elections led to political jockeying and delays in cabinet appointment, it is likely that the upcoming ones in 2018 would be doing so as well with considerable implication for a national reconciliation process in support of transitional justice. Namely the key factors would be a delaying tactics in signing and endorsing the agreements written among the parties and different bodies in parliament, having a number of politicians who would be considered as perpetrators become high ranking members of the next government, lack of accountability mechanisms enforcement.

However, these risks have to the extent that is possible been factored in the design of the strategy and the activities. First and foremost, the focus on communities allows UNDP to bypass the high level politicking and get a sense of how political rhetoric trickles down to community narratives as regards social, ethnic and sectarian tensions.

In addition, given that the campaigning and race will begin among the candidates in the second half of 2017, most will likely be inclined to engage at least publicly in a reconciliation process to demonstrate their willingness to redress Iraq. As such, it is likely that engagement with them would be easier as well.

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#### **IV. PROJECT MANAGEMENT**

##### *Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness*

Under the leadership of the Country Director, UNDP will optimize the available resources to kick off the project. While this project will be the umbrella that brings and guides all other UNDP ongoing reconciliation related interventions, it will build on the results achieved so far. Recognizing that reconciliation is achievable when there is a national consensus accompanied by political will to undertake the necessary actions in a national led process, therefore this project will assist in laying the groundwork by building reconciliation infrastructure that is composed of; community peacebuilding platforms and networking, and national database of human rights abuses to provide information for evidence based policy making. The project will utilize the national reconciliation accumulated experiences and support in consolidating the multi existing reconciliation initiatives led by different government bodies under unified approach supported by national measurement tools to monitor community tension. It's envisioned to start up in a pilot province and scale up gradually to cover all provinces in the third year of the project life span. This approach will allow for continues horizon scanning to detect any development challenges and adjust when necessary.

##### *Project Management*

The project will operate across the country with greater focus on the liberated areas targeting the community level. It is expected to start in a few selected communities that will be identified in consultation with the national counterparts, benefiting from the conflict analyses carried out by different actors. Progressively, the project will scale up to cover all provinces, however the project will be managed from the main office in Baghdad and will rely on the national area coordinators (18 areas coordinator will be recruited) to build the network and maintain proper presence in all areas of operation. The UNDP country office will provide the support services and will optimize the fast track modality currently in effect to accelerate implantation. The project will also benefit from UNDP global and regional support tools, such as the Crisis Response Unit, and peacebuilding team at the UNDP regional hub to source, mobilize and deploy high calibre experts.

V. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

**Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework:**  
 Outcome 1: Reformed legal and law enforcement institutions that are more transparent and accountable  
 Outcome 2: Conditions improved for the safe return of IDPs in Newly Liberated Areas

**Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:**  
 CPD indicators with reference to the corresponding Strategic plan indicators stated in the IRRF  
 3.1.4 Local and provincial reconciliation processes established and functioning  
 3.1.4.A: *Number of efforts to build consensus and foster reconciliation that lead to specific agreements (SP Indicator 6.4.1.A.1.1)*  
 Baseline: TBD  
 Target: 1 per tension hotspot (sub-district level), estimated 15 tension hotspots throughout KRI and Iraq  
 3.1.4.B: *Attendance of different parties relevant to local conflict in reconciliation processes*  
 Baseline: TBD  
 Target: 200 per province  
 3.1.4.C: *Number of reconciliation activities led by youth/ NGOs/ women’s groups (SP Indicator 6.4.1.A.1.3) (SP Indicator 2.4.1.A.1.1) (SP Indicator 2.4.1.A.2.1)*  
 Baseline: TBD  
 Target: 5 per governorate

**Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan:**  
 Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-conflict and post-disaster settings

**Project title and Atlas Project Number: Support to Integrated Reconciliation in Iraq**

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR OVERALL PROJECT PERIOD (YEARS) <sup>1</sup>	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS
<b>Output 1:</b> Awareness campaigns to inform target communities of the peace committees and the “Citizens’ Archive” are designed and carried out	1.1 Reconciliation message disseminated to at least 60% of Iraqi population  1.2 Gain support form key Iraqi stakeholders for process	<b>Activity Result 1.1:</b> Awareness Campaign in selected local communities is designed and carried out.  <i>Action 1.1.1</i> Develop reconciliation awareness Messaging  <i>Action 1.1.2</i> Develop Information Brochures	UNDP, UNAMI, GOI, Local Authorities, NGOs	Workshops Technical Assistance Equipment Staffing

<p><b>Output Indicators:</b></p> <p>1.1 Number of Iraqi champions of reconciliation recruited (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>1.2 Number of Iraq champions capacitated (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>1.3 % increase in individuals who believe reconciliation can be achieved</p> <p>1.4 number of successful campaigns carried out in the project locations.</p> <p>1.5 Number of baseline study conducted</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> To be Defined.</p>	<p>to determine the principles of National Reconciliation</p> <p>1.3 New baseline assessment conducted and established benchmark for M&amp;E to measure levels of Integrated Community-Led Reconciliation</p> <p>1.4 At least 50 Iraqi champions of reconciliation are recruited and capacitated</p>	<p><b>Activity Result 1.2</b> local and national reconciliation champions who will lead and inspire the reconciliation efforts in the selected communities are Identified and mobilized</p> <p>Action 1.2.1 Conduct Baseline studies in Pilot communities to measure levels of Integrated Community-Led Reconciliation</p> <p>Action 1.2.2 Recruit Iraqi champions of Reconciliation</p> <p>Action 1.2.3 capacitate local and national champions</p> <p>Action 1.2.4 Conduct a Workshop with Cross-sectarian Civic Champions on principles for Integrated Community-Led and National Reconciliation</p>		
<p><b>Output 2:</b> Active effective networks of Community Reconciliation Platforms are established.</p> <p><b>Output Indicators:</b></p> <p>2.1 Number of Local Reconciliation Committees functioning</p> <p>2.2 Number of collective interaction between Local Reconciliation Committees in communities across the targeted areas</p> <p>2.3 Number of evidence of collective interaction between Local</p>	<p>2.1 At least 20 new Local Reconciliation Committees were established and capacitated.</p> <p>2.2 Creation of 3-4 inter-linked networks of newly and already existing reconciliation committees, bodies and initiatives operating at district, provincial and national levels</p> <p>2.3 Development of Social cohesion measurement tool which will track change over time in order to assess impact</p>	<p><b>Result Activity 2.1</b> Establish, capacitate and link Local Reconciliation Committees (LRC) at district, provincial and national levels</p> <p>Action 2.1.1 Conduct consultations to identify members and set criteria for selection</p> <p>Action 2.1.2 Develop local capacity for Early warning, Conflict Resolution, Transitional Justice Community Needs Prioritization</p> <p>Actions 2.1.3 Support forums of interaction between various Local Reconciliation Committees</p>	<p>UNDP, UNAMI, GOI, Local Authorities, NGOs</p>	<p>Workshops Technical Assistance Equipment Staffing</p>

<p><i>Reconciliation Committees and higher level mechanisms</i></p> <p><i>2.4 Development of Social Cohesion measurement tool</i></p> <p><i>2.5 One nation-wide community reconciliation conference</i></p> <p><i>2.6 Number of vulnerable group representatives (women, youth, minorities) actively participating within LRCs</i></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b></p> <p><i>2.1 No Social cohesion measurement tool has been developed</i></p> <p><i>2.2 Twenty Local Reconciliation Committees are already established under FFIS project. In, Ninewah, Salahaldin, Anbar, Kirkuk, Basra, Najaf, 1 Karbala, Baghdad, Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaimaniyah</i></p>	<p>of the initiatives and facilitate adaptation</p> <p>2.4 One community reconciliation conference, is held to bring communities from across the country to develop civic perspectives on reconciliation</p>	<p>Action 2.1.4 Monitor existing local Reconciliation Platforms for their performance and up-scale to more locations</p>		
		<p><b>Activity Result 2.2</b> Implement Community-focused agendas, work-plans and monitoring mechanisms focusing on reconciliation-related needs</p> <p>Action 2.2.1 Develop Community Agenda Action 2.2.2 Implementation of Community Agenda Action 2.2.3 Exchange visits between initiatives</p>		<p>Workshops Technical Assistance Equipment Staffing</p>
		<p><b>Activity Result 2.3</b> Develop Social cohesion measurement tool, which will track change over time in order to assess impact of the initiatives and facilitate adaptation.</p> <p>Action 2.3.1 Develop Social Cohesion Measurement Tool Action 2.3.2 Baseline study for PHASE 1</p>		<p>Workshops Technical Assistance Equipment</p>
		<p><b>Activity Result 2.4</b> Hold a community reconciliation conference, drawing on communities from across the country to develop civic perspectives on, and demands for, the implementation of the findings of the project.</p> <p>Action 2.4.1 Facilitate engagement between all reconciliation actors to assist in arranging the conference Action 2.4.2 Consult communities on 'dealing with the past' and other matters related to transitional justice, including truth-</p>		<p>Workshops Technical Assistance Equipment Travel</p>

		telling, vetting, reparation, accountability, and measures to ensure non-recurrence; Action 2.4.3 Consult Minority and IDP groups on their specific needs, demands and aspirations		
<p><b>Output 3</b> National archive of every community's narrative of their own trauma and experience is developed.</p> <p><b>Output indicators:</b></p> <p>3.1 Number of consultation and dialogue sessions carried out</p> <p>3.2 Number of statement takers recruited, capacitated and deployed (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>3.3 Number of individual statements recorded of Iraqi who suffered GHV</p> <p>3.4 Creation of community driven data base</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b></p> <p>3.1 No citizens archive has been done in Iraq</p>	<p>3.1 Develop community-driven data base that aims to record all human rights violations</p> <p>3.2 Prepare Analytical report of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for transitional justice</p> <p>3.3 Digitizing testimonies</p>	<p><b>Activity Result 3.1</b> Initiate Preparatory work to establish system to safely record, store and analyse a critical mass of testimonies from victims of GVH's.</p> <p>Action 3.1.1 Development of different programming activities mainstreamed into local systems.</p> <p>Action 3.1.2 Training sessions for local judicial authorities and communities of returnees</p> <p>Action 3.1.3 Facilitate community dialogues aimed to identify obstacles to reconciliation</p> <p>Action 3.1.4 Consult communities on 'dealing with the past' and other matters related to transitional justice, including truth-telling, vetting, reparation, accountability, and measures to ensure non-recurrence; report to NRC</p> <p>Action 3.1.4 Develop a community-driven data base that aims to record all human rights violations in living memory</p> <p>Action 3.1.5 consultations with selected IDP communities and minority groups</p>	UNDP, UNAMI, GOI, Local Authorities, NGOs	
		<p><b>Activity Result 3.2</b> Collect Individual statements of Iraqis who have suffered and been subjected to gross human rights</p> <p>Action 3.2.1 Meeting/Consultation with the members of the anti-ISIS coalition to mainstream the concept of reconciliation</p>		

		<p>and foster the international community buy-in</p> <p>Action 3.2.2 Launch in four carefully selected pilot communities to emphasise the non-sectarian, inclusive, national scope and intent of the process</p> <p>Action 3.2.3 Recruit, Train and Capacitate 12 Statement Taking Teams (3/4 people per team)</p> <p>Action 3.2.4 Deploy teams to 18 Governorates for 18 months</p> <p>Action 3.2.5 Digitizing testimonies</p> <p><b>Activity Result 3.3</b> Analytical report of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for transitional justice, is prepared and delivered to the Gol,</p> <p>Action 3.3.1 Write up an interim report by analysts on the findings and recommendations on the next step for a Transitional Justice process in Iraq, delivered as policy recommendations to the NRC, the PM and the President</p>		
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\* Detailed work plan and budget will be prepared and updated annually



## VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans: *[Note: monitoring and evaluation plans should be adapted to project context, as needed]*

### Monitoring Plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly, or in the frequency required for each indicator.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.	UNAMI	\$89,285
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.	UNAMI	\$92,857
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.	UNAMI	\$102,857
Annual Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.	UNAMI	\$52,857
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making.	At least annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.	UNAMI	\$89,285
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)		UNAMI	N/A

	level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk long with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.				
Project Review (Project Board)	The project's governance mechanism (i.e., project board) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Multi-Year Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	Specify frequency (i.e., at least annually)	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.	UNAMI	N/A

#### Evaluation Plan<sup>2</sup>

Evaluation Title	Partners (if joint)	Related Strategic Plan Output	UNDAF/CPD Outcome	Planned Completion Date	Key Evaluation Stakeholders	Cost and Source of Funding
Mid-Term Evaluation	Government Counterparts/UNAMI	Policy frameworks and institutional mechanisms enabled at the national and sub-national levels for the peaceful management of emerging and recurring conflicts and tensions.	Conditions improved for the safe return of internally displaced persons in newly liberated areas	July 2018	UNDP, UNAMI, GOI, PC, CSOs; T&R leaders; NRC	\$84,285
Final Evaluation	Government Counterparts /UNAMI	Policy frameworks and institutional mechanisms enabled at the national and sub-national levels for the peaceful management of emerging and recurring conflicts and tensions.	Conditions improved for the safe return of internally displaced persons in newly liberated areas	December 2019	UNDP, UNAMI, GOI, PC, CSOs; T&R leaders; NRC	\$119,850

<sup>2</sup>GOI: Government of Iraq

PC: Provincial Council

CSO: Civil Society Organization

## VII. MULTI-YEAR WORK PLAN

All anticipated programmatic and operational costs to support the project, including development effectiveness and implementation support arrangements, need to be identified, estimated and fully costed in the project budget under the relevant output(s). This includes activities that directly support the project, such as communication, human resources, procurement, finance, audit, policy advisory, quality assurance, reporting, management, etc. All services which are directly related to the project need to be disclosed transparently in the project document.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget by Year					RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount \$
<p><b>Output 1:</b> Awareness campaigns to inform target communities of the peace committees and the “Citizens’ Archive” are designed and carried out</p> <p><b>Output Indicators:</b></p> <p>1.1 Number of Iraqi champions of reconciliation recruited (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>1.2 Number of Iraq champions capacitated (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>1.3 % increase in individuals who believe reconciliation can be achieved</p> <p>1.4 number of successful campaigns carried out in the project locations.</p> <p>1.5 Number of baseline study conducted</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> To be Defined.</p>	<p><b>Activity Result 1.1:</b> Awareness Campaign in selected local communities is designed and carried out.</p> <p>Action 1.1.1 Develop reconciliation awareness Messaging</p> <p>Action 1.1.2 Develop Information Brochures</p>	X	X	X	X	X	UNDP, PC, CSOs; T&R leaders; NRC	TBD Partially FCO UK	Consultants Awareness campaigns training workshops Publications Deployment of International and national experts	7,500,000
	<p><b>Activity Result 1.2</b> local and national reconciliation champions who will lead and inspire the reconciliation efforts in the selected communities are Identified and mobilized</p> <p>Action 1.2.1 Conduct Baseline studies in Pilot communities to measure levels of Integrated Community-Led Reconciliation</p> <p>1.2.2 Recruit Iraqi champions of Reconciliation</p> <p>Action 1.2.3 capacitate local and national champions</p> <p>Action 1.2.4 Conduct a Workshop with Cross-sectarian Civic Champions on principles for Integrated Community-Led and National Reconciliation</p>	X	X	X	X	X	UNDP, PC, CSOs; T&R leaders; NRC	TBD Partially FCO UK		

<p><b>Output 2: Active</b> Effective networks of Community Reconciliation Platforms are established.</p> <p><b>Output Indicators:</b></p> <p><i>2.1 Number of Local Reconciliation Committees functioning</i></p> <p><i>2.2 Number of collective interaction between Local Reconciliation Committees in communities across the targeted areas</i></p> <p><i>2.3 Number of evidence of collective interaction between Local Reconciliation Committees and higher level mechanisms</i></p> <p><i>2.4 Development of Social Cohesion measurement tool</i></p> <p><i>2.5 One nation-wide community reconciliation conference</i></p> <p><i>2.6 Number of vulnerable group representatives (women, youth, minorities) actively participating within LRCs</i></p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 2.1 No Social cohesion measurement tool has been developed</p>	<p><b>Result Activity 2.1</b> Establish, capacitate and link Local Reconciliation Committees (LRC) at district, provincial and national levels</p> <p>Action 2.1.1 Conduct consultations to identify members and set criteria for selection</p> <p>Action 2.1.2 Develop local capacity for Early warning, Conflict Resolution, Transitional Justice Community Needs Prioritization</p> <p>Actions 2.1.3 Support forums of interaction between various Local Reconciliation Committees</p> <p>Action 2.1.4 Monitor existing local Reconciliation Platforms for their performance and up-scale to more locations</p> <p><b>Activity Result 2.2</b> Implement Community-focused agendas, work-plans and monitoring mechanisms focusing on reconciliation-related needs</p> <p>Action 2.2.1 Develop Community Agenda Action 2.2.2 Implementation of Community Agenda Action 2.2.3 Exchange visits between initiatives</p> <p><b>Activity Result 2.3</b> Develop Social cohesion measurement tool, which will track change over time in order to assess impact of the initiatives and facilitate adaptation.</p> <p>Action 2.3.1 Develop Social Cohesion Measurement Tool Action 2.3.2 Baseline study for PHASE 1</p>						<p>UNDP, NRC, HC, UNAMI, PC</p>	<p>TBD Partially FCO UK</p>	<p>Training workshops Publications, Deployment of International and national experts</p>	<p><b>10,000,000</b></p>
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<p>2.2 Twenty Local Reconciliation Committees are already established under FFIS project. In, Ninewah, Salahaldin, Anbar, Kirkuk, Basra, Najaf, 1 Karbala, Baghdad, Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaimaniyah</p>	<p><b>Activity Result 2.4</b> Hold a community reconciliation conference, drawing on communities from across the country to develop civic perspectives on, and demands for, the implementation of the findings of the project.</p> <p>Action 2.4.1 Facilitate engagement between all reconciliation actors to assist in arranging the conference</p> <p>Action 2.4.2 Consult communities on 'dealing with the past' and other matters related to transitional justice, including truth-telling, vetting, reparation, accountability, and measures to ensure non-recurrence;</p> <p>Action 2.4.3 Consult Minority and IDP groups on their specific needs, demands and aspirations</p>	X	X	X	X	X				
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<p><b>Output 3</b> National archive of every community's narrative of their own trauma and experience is developed.</p> <p><b>Output indicators:</b></p> <p>3.1 Number of consultation and dialogue sessions carried out</p> <p>3.2 Number of statement takers recruited, capacitated and deployed (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>3.3 Number of individual statements recorded of Iraqi who suffered GHV</p> <p>3.4 Creation of community driven data base</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b></p> <p>3.1 No citizens archive has been done in Iraq</p>	<p><b>Activity Result 3.1</b> Initiate Preparatory work to establish system to safely record, store and analyse a critical mass of testimonies from victims of GVH's.</p> <p>Action 3.1.1 Development of different programming activities mainstreamed into local systems.</p> <p>Action 3.1.2 Training sessions for local judicial authorities and communities of returnees</p> <p>Action 3.1.3 Facilitate community dialogues aimed to identify obstacles to reconciliation</p> <p>Action 3.1.4 Consult communities on 'dealing with the past' and other matters related to transitional justice, including truth-telling, vetting, reparation, accountability, and measures to ensure non-recurrence; report to NRC</p> <p>Action 3.1.4 Develop a community-driven data base that aims to record all human rights violations in living memory</p> <p>Action 3.1.5 consultations with selected IDP communities and minority groups</p>									<p>Consultants Awareness campaigns training workshops Publications</p>	<p><b>25,000,000</b></p>
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	<p><b>Activity Result 3.2</b> Collect Individual statements of Iraqis who have suffered and been subjected to gross human rights</p> <p>Action 3.2.1 Meeting/Consultation with the members of the anti-ISIS coalition to mainstream the concept of reconciliation and foster the international community buy-in</p> <p>Action 3.2.2 Launch in four carefully selected pilot communities to emphasise the non-sectarian, inclusive, national scope and intent of the process</p> <p>Action 3.2.3 Recruit, Train and Capacitate 12 Statement Taking Teams (3/4 people per team)</p> <p>Action 3.2.4 Deploy teams to 18 Governorates for 18 months</p> <p>Action 3.2.5 Digitizing testimonies</p>										
	<p><b>Activity Result 3.3</b> Analytical report of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for transitional justice, is prepared and delivered to the GoI,</p> <p>Action 3.3.1 Write up an interim report by analysts on the findings and recommendations on the next step for a Transitional Justice process in Iraq, delivered as policy recommendations to the NRC, the PM and the President</p>	X	X	X		X					
	MONITORING										
	Sub-Total for Output 3										
	Total of all outputs										<b>42,500,000</b>
Evaluation (as relevant)	EVALUATION 1.5%										


General Management Support	Travel & DSA									\$178,571
	Misc									\$78,514
	Common Premises									\$168,571
	Communications 2.5%									\$1,053,571
	Security 4%									\$1,685,714
	Monitoring and Evaluation (1.5%)									\$631,429
GMS 8%										\$3,703,710
<b>TOTAL</b>										<b>\$ 50,000,000</b>



## VIII. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

This project will be directly implemented (DIM) by UNDP Iraq in consultation with the project's beneficiaries and other project partners. The Project manager will head the project and under the overall supervision of the Country Director and supported by senior international expert and senior national programme specialist. Focal points (UNDP/GOI) will be assigned for the coordination and communication role with Government of Iraq. The Project manager and focal points will be responsible to the Steering Committee for overall implementation of the project. The steering committee, which serves as Project Board, comprises the following members:

- **Project Executive:** Country Director of UNDP;
- **Senior Stakeholder:** Representatives of Donors to the programme;
- **Senior User:** Government of Iraq



## IX. Legal Context

This document together with the CPAP signed by the Government and UNDP which is incorporated herein by reference, constitute together a Project Document as referred to in the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA); as such all provisions of the CPAP apply to this document. All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner”, as such term is defined and used in the CPAP and this document.

UNDP as the Implementing Partner shall comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations safety and security management system.

UNDP will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds] [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document] are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via [http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml). This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

## ANNEXES

### Quality Management

<b>OUTPUT 1: Awareness campaigns to inform target communities of the peace committees and the “Citizens’ Archive” are designed and carried out</b>		
<b>Activity Result 1 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 1.1: Awareness Campaign in selected local communities is designed and carried out.</b>	Start Date: 01 February 2015 End Date: 30 March 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>	<b>Quality Method</b>	<b>Date of Assessment</b>
Number of successful campaigns carried out in the project locations.	Survey, interviews, meetings minutes, progress reports	31 March 2015
Increase in individuals who believe reconciliation can be achieved	Perception survey, interviews, Field visits	
<b>Activity Result 2 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 1.2 local and national reconciliation champions who will lead and inspire the reconciliation efforts in the selected communities are Identified and mobilized</b>	Start Date: 15 January 2015 End Date: 30 September 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>	<b>Quality Method</b>	<b>Date of Assessment</b>
Number of baseline studies conducted	Baseline study report,	
Number of Iraqi champions of reconciliation recruited	Survey, Progress report	
Number of Iraqi champions capacitated	Survey, Training evaluation	
<b>OUTPUT 2: Effective networks of Community Reconciliation Platforms are established.</b>		
<b>Activity Result 1 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Result Activity 2.1 Establish, capacitate and link Local Reconciliation Committees (LRC) at district, provincial and national levels</b>	Start Date: January 2015 End Date: September 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>	<b>Quality Method</b>	<b>Date of Assessment</b>
Number of Local Reconciliation Committees functioning	Monitoring visits, LRCs meetings minutes, reports, IPs report Monitoring reports, surveys.	April 2015
Number of collective interaction between Local Reconciliation Committees and higher level mechanisms	Perception survey, progress reports, meetings minutes, joint workshops report	Sept. 2015
Number of vulnerable group representatives (women, youth, minorities) actively participating within LRCs	Field Monitoring Visits, IPs report Monitoring reports, joint workshops report	
<b>Activity Result 2 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 2.2 Implement Community-focused agendas, work-plans and monitoring mechanisms focusing on reconciliation-related needs</b>	Start Date: January 2015 End Date: February 2015

Number of collective interaction between Local Reconciliation Committees in communities across the targeted areas		
<b>Activity Result 3 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 2.3 Develop Social cohesion measurement tool, which will track change over time in order to assess impact of the initiatives and facilitate adaptation.</b>	Start Date: January 2015 End Date: February 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>		<b>Quality Method</b>
Development of Social Cohesion measurement tool		Instruments developed and adheres to international best practices
<b>Activity Result 4 (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 2.4 Hold a community reconciliation conference, drawing on communities from across the country to develop civic perspectives on, and demands for, the implementation of the findings of the project.</b>	Start Date: January 2015 End Date: February 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>		<b>Quality Method</b>
One nation-wide community reconciliation conference		Survey, Final report
<b>OUTPUT 3: National archive of every community's narrative of their own trauma and experience is developed.</b>		
<b>Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 3.1: Initiate Preparatory work to establish system to safely record, store and analyse a critical mass of testimonies from victims of GVH's.</b>	Start Date: January 2015 End Date: February 2015
<b>Quality Criteria</b>		<b>Quality Method</b>
Number of consultation and dialogue sessions carried out		Meetings minutes and joint workshops reports, monitoring visits.
Number of statement takers recruited, capacitated and deployed		Survey, progress report
<b>Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 3.2 Collect Individual statements of Iraqis who have suffered and been subjected to gross human rights</b>	Start Date: End Date:
<b>Quality Criteria</b>		<b>Quality Method</b>
Number of individual statements recorded of Iraqi who suffered GHV		Statements records, monitoring visit, progress reports
Creation of community driven data base		Statements records, interviews, progress reports
<b>Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)</b>	<b>Activity Result 3.3 Analytical report of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for transitional justice, is prepared and delivered to the GoI,</b>	Start Date: End Date:
<b>Quality Criteria</b>		<b>Quality Method</b>
Analytical report of the victim statements, and containing recommendations for transitional justice, is prepared and delivered to the GoI		Meetings minutes, Final report

**Risk Log:**

#	Description	Type	Impact & Priority	Countermeasures / Mngt response	Owner
1	Lack of resource and capacity to support project implementation	Operational	Inadequate human and financial requirement will affect the implementation	Ensure continuous consultation with the government and other partners to identify and provide necessary resources. Efforts should be invested in fund raising.	Programme Manager
2	Lack of project ownership by the national partners	Strategic/operational	Poor involvement of national counterparts would impact the effective project implementation, hence, it will reduce the result and sustainability.	Engage the government and all national counterparts through the project, to ensure their buy-in. Also involving the local authorities at the govern0rate level and always seek the incorporate their needs and priorities	Programme Manager
3	Reduced technical Capacity of the reconciliation Team to implement expanding projects.	Operational	Could have an impact on the quality of the activities I=3 P=5	Management has advertised key positions and recruitment ongoing. Newly vacated positions soon to be advertised.	Programme Manager
4	Volatility of security situation with possibly increased levels of violence and insecurity due to interethnic or religious conflict.	Security	Insecurity will limit access to targeted communities and therefore affect the project implementation  P =3, I = 5	Ensure strong coordination with local authorities and partners. Intervention is subject to principles of engagement to mitigate the risk.	Programme Manager
6	Slow absorption and recruitment of project staff	Operational	This would delay implementation of technical aspects of the projects	Existing staff from window 4 under FFIS will provide support until the recruitment of project staff is completed.	Programme Manager